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Abstract 
In order to better utilize historical process data from faulty operations, supervised learning methods, 
such as Fisher discriminant analysis (FDA), have been adopted in process monitoring. However, such 
methods can only separate known faults from normal operations, and they have no means to deal with 
unknown faults. In addition, most of these methods are not designed for handling non-Gaussian 
distributed data; however, non-Gaussianity is frequently observed in industrial processes. In this paper, 
a hybrid multivariate approach named mixture discriminant monitoring (MDM) was proposed, in 
which supervised learning and statistical process control (SPC) charting techniques are integrated. 
MDM is capable of solving both of the above problems simultaneously during online process 
monitoring. Then, for known faults, a root-cause diagnosis can be automatically achieved, while for 
unknown faults, abnormal variables can be isolated through missing variable analysis. MDM was used 
on the benchmark Tennessee Eastman (TE) process, and the results showed the capability of the 
proposed approach. 
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1. Introduction 
In manufacturing processes, product quality and process safety rely upon stable operations under 
normal conditions. In order to achieve efficient process monitoring and fault diagnosis, data-based 
multivariate statistical process control (MSPC) methods have been intensively researched in recent 
years.
1-3
 Most of these methods conduct process modeling based on a fault-free training dataset; 
however, real process data always include a certain number of faulty samples due to various types of 
sensor faults and process abnormalities. Hence, it is natural to think about developing monitoring 
methods that are based on both normal-operation and fault-related information. 
In recent years, Fisher discriminant analysis (FDA),
4
 which is a popular supervised learning 
method, has been applied to process monitoring for more efficient fault detection and diagnosis.
5-7
 FDA 
was originally developed as a linear dimensionality reduction technique, which determines a set of 
linear transformation vectors and seeks the optimal separating directions between different classes. 
When applied to process monitoring, FDA-based methods utilize both normal and faulty data for 
process modeling, where historical data are classified to different classes associated with the process 
status. During online monitoring, known faults can then be separated from normal operations based on 
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the classification model. Thus, fault detection is achieved, and diagnosis results are obtained at the 
same time. 
However, these methods rely only on data classification, and they do not provide the control charts 
that conventional statistical process control (SPC) can provide. As a result, they are not capable of 
dealing with the unknown faults that are often observed in industrial processes. Even for known faults, 
monitoring solely based on classification results may lead to delayed detection. Therefore, the lack of a 
control chart is a major disadvantage of the existing monitoring methods based on supervised learning. 
In addition, the success of FDA classification relies on the assumption of within-class Gaussianity. 
However, non-Gaussian distribution of process data is common, especially in regards to multiple 
operation modes. In multimode processes, although the normal operation data collected in each mode 
will approximate a normal distribution, the overall data distribution is usually non-Gaussian. Similarly, 
when the same type of fault occurs in different modes, the overall distribution of the faulty data will 
also deviate from a Gaussian distribution. To address this issue, Choi et al. proposed the use of 
principal component analysis (PCA), Gaussian mixture model (GMM) and optimal discriminant 
analysis for non-Gaussian process fault detection and diagnosis.
8
 However, their method ignores the 
multimodality in the classes of faults. Most recently, Yu introduced localized Fisher discriminant 
analysis (LFDA) to process monitoring.
9
 Although LFDA works well in non-Gaussian data 
classification, it does not provide a control chart for efficient fault detection. 
Other methods for non-Gaussian process monitoring include various extensions of the 
conventional MSPC methods,
10-14
 independent component analysis (ICA),
15-18
 GMM,
19-21
 multiset PCA 
(MsPCA),
22
 and so on. Nevertheless, none of these methods utilize the information contained in 
historical faulty data, since they are all unsupervised methods. In addition, a possibilistic unsupervised 
clustering method was proposed  to detect both known and unknown faults.
23
 While such a clustering 
method is useful when the correct label of the fault is not available, it differs from supervised 
classification, as it does not utilize the known fault types. In the meantime, the possibilistic clustering 
does not address non-Gaussian distributions. 
To overcome the above problems, this paper proposed a hybrid multivariate approach known as 
mixture discriminant monitoring (MDM). This approach integrates mixture discriminant analysis 
(MDA)
24, 25
 and SPC charting. The primary contributions of this study are as follows. The proposed 
MDM method inherits the advantages of both supervised learning and SPC charting techniques. It not 
only can deal with non-Gaussian process data but also has the ability to detect both known and 
unknown faults efficiently. Furthermore, for known faults, a root-cause diagnosis can be achieved, 
while for unknown faults in which the exact types are unavailable, fault isolation is carried on using 
missing data analysis, in order to identify the most contributing variables. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the proposed MDM approach is 
presented, including supervised modeling using MDA and the development of the SPC control chart. 
The entire procedure of process modeling and online fault detection based on MDM is introduced in 
section 3. Section 4 describes the method for the root-cause diagnosis of known faults, as well as the 
algorithm of unknown faults isolation. In section 5, the case studies on the benchmark Tennessee 
Eastman (TE) process verify the capability of the proposed approach. Finally, the conclusions are 
drawn in section 6. 
 
2. Mixture discriminant monitoring 
2.1 Step 1: classification model building for non-Gaussian process data 
In the first step of MDM, mixture discriminant analysis (MDA)
24, 25
 is adopted to build a classification 
model for the non-Gaussian process data. MDA is a supervised learning method for multimodal data 
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classification in which the class densities are modeled by Gaussian mixtures of several subclass models, 
where each subclass has a multivariate normal distribution. Such properties make MDA a better 
method than FDA for non-Gaussian process data classification. 
As mentioned previously, in industry, historical process data not only are collected under normal 
operating conditions but also contain fault-related information that is helpful to improve fault diagnosis. 
Associated with process status, measurements can be partitioned into different classes, with each data 
class corresponding to either normal operation or a particular type of abnormality. Meanwhile, 
depending on the process characteristics, within-class non-Gaussianity may exist, especially when the 
process has multiple operation modes. 
 Here, assume that the training dataset  1 2
T
nX x x x  has the dimensions of n×m, where 
m is the number of process variables and n is the number of samples. The training sample vector xi (i = 
1, 2,..., n) is known to belong to a class j, where j = 1, 2,..., J. J is the total number of classes, including 
one normal operation class and (J-1) faulty operation classes that corresponds to different types of 
known faults. To describe the within-class non-Gaussianity, each class j may be further divided into Rj 
subclasses, denoted by cjr, r = 1,..., Rj. The total number of subclasses is 
1
.
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subclass, the data will have a multivariate normal distribution with a mean vector μjr and a covariance 
matrix Σjr. Therefore, the non-Gaussian distribution in class j can be modeled by a mixture of Rj 
Gaussian distributions. Especially in multimode processes, R1 is usually equal to the number of modes, 
supposing class 1 is the normal operation class. The values of Rj may vary for different j, because 
various types of faults may be observed in different operation modes.  
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The parameters, μjr, Σjr and πjr, can be estimated by maximizing the following likelihood function: 
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where the parameter ={ , , ; 1,2, , , 1,2, , }jr jr jr jr R j J   μ Σ . This can be achieved by the 
iterative expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. In each iteration, provided that x is a training 
sample in the jth class, the posterior probability of x belonging to the rth subclass of class j is: 
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The above equation is known as the expectation step (E-step), which is followed by the maximization 
step (M-step): 
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The E-step and the M-step are repeated iteratively until convergence. The posterior class probabilities 
of data sample x are then calculated using Bayes’ theorem: 
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For data classification, when a new sample, newx , is measured, its posterior class probabilities can be 
calculated using (7). Then, newx  is classified into class j corresponding to the largest P(j|xnew), where j 
= 1, 2, ..., J. 
To conduct the EM iteration above, the number of total classes J and the cluster sizes Rj (j = 1, 
2, ..., J), i.e., the number of subclasses in each class, should be determined. Usually, the knowledge of 
class number J is available. In multimode processes, the values of Rj may also be known. If this is not 
the case, k-means or learning vector quantization (LVQ) techniques can be adopted for the estimation 
of Rj. For more details about the selection of cluster sizes, please refer to the cited paper
24
. 
 
2.2 Step 2: development of control chart 
Supervised learning techniques, including MDA, were originally proposed for classifying data into 
known classes according to certain probability indexes or similarity indexes. Most of these techniques 
have no means to deal with data belonging to unknown classes. In industry, it is nearly impossible to 
know all types of faults. On the contrary, historical databases often only contain normal operating data 
and several frequently observed types of faults, while other faults are unknown. As illustrated in Fig. 1, 
unknown faults may be classified into either normal operation class or classes corresponding to certain 
known faults, causing missing alarms or incorrect diagnosis. Hence, it is necessary to integrate SPC 
control charts with supervised learning to improve both fault detection and diagnosis. 
To construct a control chart, two key components must be determined, which are the monitoring 
statistic and the control limits. In the second step of MDM-based process modeling, a monitoring 
statistic is derived from the probability density function (pdf) of the data. If a collected sample is 
classified into class j, the corresponding value of the monitoring statistic is equal to log( ( ))jm x , 
where j = 1, 2, ..., J. Then, using a confidence level of 100β%, the pdf confidence bound of subclass k 
in class j is defined using a threshold hjk that satisfies the following: 
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where x belongs to this subclass. The corresponding subclass control limit is log( )jkh . There are 
several ways to estimate hjk. When the number of historical samples in class j is sufficiently large, the 
likelihood of all these samples can be calculated and hjk can be directly identified 
19
. This approach is 
usually applicable to the normal operation class, which could contain thousands of nominal data points 
for model training. However, it may be unreliable to use such an approach to calculate hjk for faulty 
operation classes, since the historical sample number of each type of fault is possibly limited. To solve 
this problem, numerical Monte Carlo (MC) simulations
26, 27
 can be conducted to approximate the 
integral in (8). This paper omitted the technical details of Monte Carlo simulations, in order to keep the 
paper within a reasonable length and to maintain readability. Interested readers can refer to the cited 
references. 
Using the monitoring statistic and the control limits, a control chart can be plotted for online fault 
detection. The detailed procedure will be introduced in the next section. The control limits introduced 
above are particularly suitable for monitoring multimode processes in which the data are approximately 
normally distributed within each mode. Under such a situation, a control chart that has the subclass 
control limit log( )jkh  can reveal the local characteristics of each operation mode. An alternative 
selection is to use the class control limit log( )jh  instead of log( )jkh  in the control chart, where hj is 
the pdf confidence bound of class j derived in a similar way as in (8). Such a control chart is suggested 
when monitoring single-mode non-Gaussian processes. 
It is worthy to notice that, in conventional MSPC, the process model is always assumed to exactly 
represent the nominal operation conditions (NOC), and thus any deviation from this model raises 
alarms. In this paper, a similar assumption is followed, i.e. the MDM model is assumed to well 
represent both the NOC and the operation conditions of known faults. However, in reality, even if the 
operation conditions are stationary and the model structure is within the correct family of the true 
process, the model cannot be perfectly obtained with limited data. Instead, there exists uncertainty in 
the model parameters. The significance of the results depends not only on the size but also on the 
distribution of the training data. To set a clear focus of this paper, the assessment of model uncertainty 
is not conducted here, and will be addressed in the follow-on study. 
Another issue in industrial applications is the changing behaviors of processes caused by aging 
factors, changes in raw materials, weather conditions, etc. Such changing behaviors are out of the scope 
of this paper and not considered in the above modeling procedure, but some discussions are provided as 
follows. In MSPC, the changing behaviors have been well addressed by using the recursive models or 
moving windows.
28-31
 Similar idea can be utilized to improve the performance of MDM in such 
situations. However, the frequency of model updating (or the size of each moving window) is still an 
open question in recursive modeling, which relates to the process characteristics and is case-dependent. 
Process knowledge is very helpful in the determination of the model updating frequency and the 
window size. Alternatively, one can also update the model whenever a new sample is available. There 
is a tradeoff between maximizing the use of available data and minimizing the computation time. 
 
3. Procedure of modeling and online fault detection 
The modeling procedure of the proposed MDM method is shown in Fig. 2(a) and summarized below: 
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1.  Build an MDA classification model based on the historical process data, including both normal and 
faulty operation information. 
2.  Calculate the control limits for different subclasses, based on the pdf values achieved in the MDA 
modeling step. 
3. Store the model parameters, including μjr, Σjr, πjr (r = 1, 2, ..., Rj; j = 1, 2, ..., J) and the control limits. 
 
The built model can then be utilized in online fault detection. The flowchart is plotted in Fig. 2(b). 
 
1.  When new process measurements, xnew, are collected, the classification model is utilized to assign 
the data into a known class, according to the largest value of P(j|xnew), where j = 1, 2, …, J. 
2.  Calculate the value of the monitoring statistic newlog( ( ))am x , where new class ax .  
3.  Determine the subclasses that xnew belong to by finding the maximum value of ( , )arP c ax , where r 
= 1, ..., Rj. 
4.  Supposing new subclass gx  in class a, plot both the monitoring statistic newlog( ( ))am x  and the 
corresponding control limit log( )agh  on the control chart and compare them. 
 
(a)  If the monitoring statistic is below the control limit and class a is the normal operation class, the 
process status is normal. 
(b)  If the monitoring statistic is below the control limit and class a is a faulty operation class, a 
known fault is detect. 
(c)  If the monitoring statistic is beyond the control limit, an unknown fault is captured. 
 
Note that the common assumptions of conventional SPC methods should also be held for utilizing 
MDM in fault detection. Specifically, the training data should well characterize the both normal 
operation and the known faulty operation of the process, while the faults to be detected should be 
reflected by the process measurements.  
 
4. Fault diagnosis and isolation 
When a known fault is detected, diagnosis is required to understand the root cause of the abnormality, 
i.e., to find out the fault type. In MDM, this is a quite easy job. Since the new measurements are 
classified into a certain faulty operation class, the diagnosis results are automatically achieved. 
If a new fault with an unknown type is detected, fault isolation should be performed to identify the 
most responsible variables. Contribution plots are widely used tools in MSPM for fault isolation;
32, 33
 
however, such methods often suffer from the smearing effect and provide misleading results.
34
 To 
overcome such a problem, the idea of fault reconstruction based on missing variable analysis was 
adopted in this paper. The original idea of fault reconstruction was to deal with the situation in which 
there is only one process variable contributing to the faults at each time.
35
 During fault isolation, each 
variable is treated as if it was missing and the monitoring statistic is re-estimated. Consequently, the 
variable that most significantly reduces the monitoring statistic is considered to be the cause of the 
alarm. A similar idea has been extended to analyze the joint effect of several variables.  
Inspired by the previous research, this study developed an algorithm for MDM-based fault 
isolation. Without loss of generality, the normal operation class is labeled as class 1. The procedure is 
as follows: 
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1. Set d = 1. 
2. Select d variables as missing variables and re-estimate the monitoring statistic 1 newlog( ( ))m x  
corresponding to the “normal operation class”. Identify the d variables that minimize 1 newlog( ( ))m x . 
3. If the minimum value of the re-estimated statistic is below the confidence bound, then the 
corresponding d variables are isolated as the cause of the fault, and the algorithm is terminated. 
Otherwise, set d = d + 1, and return to step 2. 
 
When applying the above algorithm, there is an important question that must be answered: how to 
estimate the monitoring statistic 1 newlog( ( ))m x  when several variables are missing? 
Suppose each sample x can be divided into two parts, x  and x , where 
 
  
 
x
x
x
. For subclass r of class 
1 (the normal operation class), the joint probability density of x  and x  is described as: 
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Based on the parameters of the joint distribution model, it is straightforward to compute the 
expectations of %x  in class 1 given x  by conditioning the joint distribution on x  and taking the 
expected value.
36
 In each subclass r, denote the means corresponding to x  and x  as 
1,rμ  and 1,rμ , 
while the two variance matrices and the covariance matrix are 1,rΣ , 1,rΣ  and 1,rΣ , respectively. The 
mean vector and the covariance matrix estimated from the joint density can then be separated as 
1, 1, 1,[ , ]r r rμ μ μ  and 
1, 1,
1,
1, 1,
r r
r
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. Thus, supposing x  is missing, its conditional expectation in 
subclass r is derived as: 
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Consequently, for the mixture of all subclasses, the overall conditional expectation is: 
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where 
1,( | )rP c x  is the probability of missing variables x  belonging to the rth subclass, prior to 
observing x . 
1,( | )rP c x  is calculated as: 
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After the missing variables x  is reconstructed, 1 newlog( ( ))m x  can be calculated based on (7). 
Notice that when the number of variables is large, the recently proposed branch and bound (BAB) 
method
37
 can be adopted to reduce the computation burden of the proposed algorithm and find the 
minimum set of variables affected by the fault in a short time. 
Some discussions about the fault isolation procedure are provided as follows. First, when there 
exist several different combinations of variables that are regarded as the potential contributors to the 
detected fault, the above procedure is able to prioritize the combinations according to the reconstructed 
monitoring statistic. In other words, since the fault isolation is an optimization problem, it always finds 
the combination that gives the best reconstructed monitoring statistic, i.e. the minimum value of -
log(m1(xnew)).  Second, the essence of multivariate contribution analysis is to look at the "multivariate" 
contribution, i.e. to identify the most contributing combination of variables. Usually, it is not necessary 
to assign contribution of each individual variable to the fault. If really needed, one can re-run univariate 
contribution analysis on the isolated variables, and obtain the related information from the 
reconstructed values of the monitoring statistic. Third, when there are many correlated variables 
identified as the contributors, it may be desired to find out which variables are the root cause of the 
fault. Currently, multivariate contribution analysis does not explicitly address this problem. Usually, 
such situation is difficult to handle without process knowledge. Nevertheless, causality analysis may 
shed some light on root-cause diagnosis. Recently, Yang and Xiao gave a review on the related 
subject.
38
 
 
5. Case studies 
5.1 Tennessee Eastman process 
The TE benchmark process,
39
 which has been widely accepted in performance tests of control 
algorithms and monitoring approaches, was utilized to verify the effectiveness of the proposed hybrid 
method. This process has five main units, which are the reactor, condenser, separator, stripper and 
compressor, respectively. The streams of the plant consist of eight components, among which 
components A, B and C are the gaseous reactants fed to the reactor, while G and H are the products. A 
brief flow chart of the TE process is shown in Fig. 3. Since the TE plant is open-loop unstable, the 
decentralized control strategy 
40
 was implemented for the case studies in this paper. This process can be 
operated in six different modes, two of which (mode 1 and mode 3) were selected to simulate the 
multimode operation and generate non-Gaussian distributed data. A total of 52 process variables were 
measured for process monitoring, as listed in Table 1 in the Supporting Information. The sampling 
interval was 0.05 hours. For illustration of the effectiveness of the proposed MDM method, historical 
measurements from normal operation and three different types of known faults in both modes were 
collected for process modeling. These three types of faults are faults 4, 12 and 13 in the original paper
39
, 
which are caused by a step change in the reactor cooling water inlet temperature, random variations in 
the condenser cooling water inlet temperature, and the slow drift of process reaction kinetics, 
respectively. These data will be utilized in subsections 5.2 - 5.5. Then, an overall comparison between 
MDM and FDA will be conducted in subsection 5.6, based on all 20 types of faults listed in Table 2 in 
the Supporting Information. 
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5.2 Process modeling and model verification 
For process monitoring, an MDM model was built following the procedure presented in section 3, 
which was based on the training data consisting of 5000 normal operation samples collected from each 
mode and 500 faulty samples collected from each mode for each type of fault. The number of normal 
operation data was much larger than the number of historical faulty data, which was consistent with the 
reality of industrial processes. The training data were assigned into four classes, in which the normal 
data were labeled as class 1 and classes 2-4 consisted of different types of faulty data. Each class had 
two subclasses that had a clear engineering meaning: subclass 1 corresponded to operation mode 1, 
while subclass 2 corresponded to mode 3. Then, the control limits were calculated for the different 
subclasses, as described in subsection 2.2. For comparison, an FDA model was also built based on the 
same training dataset. Another 500 normal samples were collected from each mode for model 
verification, together with 500 faulty samples collected from each mode for each type of fault. Note 
that during the modeling and verification step, the transitional data from normal operation to faulty 
operations were not included in either the training or the testing set, since knowledge about such data 
may not be sufficient in real industry, making it difficult to label them in supervised learning. 
The two process models resulting from MDM and FDA
5
 were compared as shown in Fig. 4, which 
shows the typical monitoring results of the training data. In Fig. 4(a), FDA misclassified many of the 
training samples, because it did not consider the non-Gaussianity of the data. Especially, it could not 
correctly differentiate fault 12 from normal operation in mode 1, and the modeling results of fault 13 
were poor as well. In contrast, as shown in Fig. 4(b), the MDM monitoring statistic nearly always 
stayed below the 99% control limit of each corresponding subclass, indicating that MDM could 
properly model the training data and correctly reflect the underlying process status. The monitoring 
results of the verification data, which are not shown here, were similar to those shown in Fig. 4. The 
comparison revealed the effectiveness of MDM in modeling non-Gaussian distributed data. 
 
5.3 Online detection and diagnosis of known faults 
To examine the efficiency of online fault detection and diagnosis using the proposed approach, two 
testing scenarios with different kinds of known faults were designed. 
The first scenario was based on running at operation mode 1. After a normal operation period with 50 
sampling intervals, fault 4 occurred in the process and lasted for 350 sampling intervals, after which the 
process returned to normal operation. Another fault (fault 12) happened at the 451th sampling interval 
and lasted until the 800th sampling interval at which time the process returned to normal. Finally, fault 
13 affected the process between the 851th and the 1200th sampling intervals. Different from the 
training and verification data, the transitional samples between normal and faulty operations were also 
collected for online monitoring. 
The monitoring results based on FDA are shown in Fig. 5(a). Although the classification results of 
normal data and fault 4 were satisfactory, faults 12 and 13 could not be correctly identified. Most data 
from fault 12 were regarded as being normal, indicating that there were missing alarms in FDA-based 
fault detection. The detection results of fault 13 were better, although misclassifications still occurred. 
However, a large detection delay could be observed, since the fault was not detected before the 887th 
sampling interval. As introduced previously, fault 13 refers to the slow drift of the process reaction 
kinetics, which is relatively difficult to detect. 
The MDM-based monitoring results are plotted in Fig. 5(b). Since all normal operation data were 
correctly classified into the first class, the monitoring statistic 1log( ( ))m x  was used for online 
monitoring of the data. Obviously, during the periods of normal operation, the values of 1log( ( ))m x  
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were well below corresponding the control limit 1,1log( )h , where the subscript “1,1” refers to subclass 
1 in class 1 and indicates no false alarm. Similarly, the samples collected between intervals 51-400 and 
451-800 were classified into the second class (the class of fault 4) and the third class (the class of fault 
12), respectively. Therefore, the statistic 2log( ( ))m x  and the corresponding control limit 2,1log( )h  
were utilized for process monitoring between intervals 51-400, while 3log( ( ))m x  and 3,1log( )h  were 
adopted between sampling intervals 451-800. The monitoring results confirmed the classification 
results at most points, indicating that these two periods suffered from the known faults 4 and 12. Thus, 
the fault diagnosis was achieved at the same time of online fault detection. Since fault 13 was a slow 
drift, the online samples were not classified into class 4 (the class of fault 13) until sampling interval 
865. However, the control chart shows that the monitoring statistic was outside the control limit of the 
normal operation class at sampling interval 863, meaning that the exact detection delay of fault 13 was 
only twelve sampling intervals. This result was much better than that using FDA. After another two 
sampling intervals, the monitoring statistic and the control limit switched to 4log( ( ))m x  and 
4,1log( )h  according to the classification results. As seen in the control chart, for most of the time 
between the 865th and 1200th sampling intervals, 4 4,1log( ( )) log( )m h  x , indicating that the fault 
was a known fault, i.e. fault 13. 
In the second scenario, the same types of faults occurred in the process at the same sampling 
intervals found in scenario 1. The only difference was that the process operated in mode 3. 
As observed in Fig. 6, FDA identified faults 4 and 12 in this mode, but the monitoring results of 
fault 13 were not sufficient. Besides a large detection delay, many samples of fault 13 were 
misidentified as either fault 12 or normal data. MDM did a much better job of identifying the faults. 
The accuracy of the monitoring and diagnosis for normal operation, fault 4 and fault 12 was similar to 
those found in the first scenario. For fault 13, the control chart detected the fault at the 865th sampling 
interval and had an acceptable delay of 14 samples, because the monitoring statistic went beyond the 
control limit at that point. Then, at sampling interval 871, the fault was correctly diagnosed, since the 
points after 871 were classified into class 4 and the monitoring results provided by the control chart 
confirmed the classification. 
 
5.4 Online detection and isolation of unknown faults 
In this subsection, another two scenarios were designed to illustrate the online detection and isolation 
of unknown types of faults that are not included in the historical training dataset. 
In scenario 3, samples 1-50 were collected from normal operation in mode 1. Then, the process 
operation switched to mode 3. Fault 5 in the cited paper
39
, which is a step change in condenser cooling 
water inlet temperature, arose at sampling interval 101 and lasted for 350 samples. 
As shown in Fig. 7(a), the FDA model raised a number of false alarms in mode 1. A larger 
problem was that it classified the data from fault 5 into the group of fault 12. Such a mistake is easy to 
understand. Since FDA did not take fault 5 into consideration during model building, the model had no 
means to diagnose such a fault correctly. In fact, fault 5 was regarded as fault 12 in the FDA 
classification, since these two types of faults were very similar and were both about the condenser 
cooling water inlet temperature.  
As shown in Fig. 7(b), the MDM approach showed its superiority in unknown fault detection. First, 
there were no false alarms when the process was under normal operation. Second, although the model 
classified the fault into the group of fault 12, the control chart showed that there were a number of 
points at which the values of the monitoring statistic 3log( ( ))m x  were outside the control limit 
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3,2log( )h . The subscript “3,2” refers to the second subclass in the third class, corresponding to fault 12 
in mode 3. The monitoring results revealed that the fault did not really belong to fault 12; instead, it 
was identified as an unknown fault. 
After detecting an unknown fault, MDM isolated the fault using the reconstruction algorithm 
introduced in section 4. Since the fault was detected at sampling interval 101, the data on this point 
were used for fault isolation. It was found that if only one variable was treated as the missing variable, 
the smallest re-estimated value of 1log( ( ))m x  would be -12.602. Such a value would be obtained 
when variable 22, i.e. the separator cooling water outlet temperature, was reconstructed. Although the 
value was still larger than the control limit 1,3log( ) 15.7403h   , variable 22 was identified as the 
variable contributing most to the fault. Then, two variables were treated as missing variables at the 
same time. The best result was provided by reconstructing both variables 22 and 11, which was equal 
to -23.043 and was well below the control limit. Variable 11 was the product separator temperature. 
Such an isolation result was reasonable, since the separator cooling water outlet temperature was 
directly influenced by the change in the condenser cooling water inlet temperature, and because the 
fault was easy to propagate and could affect the product separator temperature in a short time. The 
isolation result could help the operators to find out the root-cause of the fault. Synthesizing the 
information provided by the MDM control chart and the fault isolation inferred that this unknown fault 
was similar to fault 12 but had a different pattern. 
The 4th scenario was about the detection of random variations in the C feed temperature, which is 
fault 10 in the cited paper
39
. In this scenario, the first 50 samples were collected from normal operation 
in mode 1, while the unknown fault 10 occurred at the 51th sampling interval. 
As indicated in Fig. 8, the FDA model partitioned most of the faulty points into the normal 
operation class and could not detect the fault. In comparison, MDM detected the fault at the 58th 
sampling interval when the monitoring statistic 1log( ( ))m x  drifted out of the control limit 1,1log( )h . 
Then, at sampling interval 62, the monitoring statistic and the control limit were switched to 
4log( ( ))m x  and 4,1log( )h , because the following samples were classified into the class of fault 13 in 
mode 1. However, since 4log( ( ))m x > 4,1log( )h  at most points after sampling interval 62, the fault 
was not really a known fault. Fault isolation was conducted to find out the most contributing variables. 
The procedure of the fault isolation was similar to that in scenario 3, and is therefore not presented here. 
Please note that the use of first several data points is a design choice. When fault occurs, the first 
several data points are representative of moving away from the normal steady-state and carry very 
useful information. Also, getting the diagnosis results as soon as possible is always desired. 
 
5.5 Online detection and isolation of multiple faults 
In industrial operations, multiple faults may happen at the same time. To illustrate the capability of the 
proposed method on handling such issue, two simultaneous faults were generated in the first operating 
mode, which were fault 2 and fault 4. Fault 2 is an unknown fault caused by a step change in the B 
composition, while fault 4 is a known fault already included in both the FDA and MDM models. Both 
faults occur at the 51st sampling interval simultaneously. 
As shown in Fig. 9(a), the faults were detected by the FDA model efficiently. Nevertheless, FDA 
divided the faulty data into the class corresponding to fault 4, which means that fault 2 was not 
recognized. In comparison, the monitoring results of MDM are plotted in Fig. 9(b). Using MDM, the 
faulty data points after the 51th sample were also successfully identified. Similar to the results of FDA, 
these points were classified to the class of fault 4. The control chart showed that the monitoring statistic 
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went outside the control limit of fault 4 quickly after the fault was detected, and returned to below the 
control limit after about 3 more sampling intervals. This may be caused by the dynamic characteristics 
of fault 4. When fault 4 occurs, the reactor temperature always increases dramatically, leading to an 
overshoot of the monitoring statistic. Then, after a while, the pattern of the fault becomes stable, while 
the values of the monitoring statistic decrease and become "in-control" (i.e. below the control limit of 
fault 4). Notice that similar pattern can be found in Figs. 5(b) and 6(b). However, the monitoring 
statistic in Fig. 9(b) drifted away from the "in-control" status again after the 57th sampling interval. 
Such phenomenon implied that the detected fault had a different pattern from the known one, although 
it looked like fault 4 to some content. 
To isolate the most contributing variables to the fault, the reconstruction algorithm was conducted 
following the steps introduced in section 4. Take the 56th sample as an example for illustration, since it 
was the first sample after the control chart indicating an unknown fault pattern. During the 
reconstruction, it was found that the value of the monitoring statistic changed significantly after taking 
variable 49, the reactor cooling water flow, as the missing variable. The statistic value decreased from 
588.4627 to 5.7107, but was still higher than the 99% control limit of the normal operation in mode 1, 
which was equal to -17.9249. Such result implied that variable 49, a potential cause to fault 4, might be 
critical but was not the only contributor to the detected fault. After both variable 49 and variable 21 
were treated as the missing variables, the reconstructed value of the monitoring statistic further 
decreased to -19.3865 that is smaller than the control limit. Therefore, variable 21, the reactor cooling 
water outlet temperature, was inferred as the second contributor to the fault. According to the results in 
the cited paper
37
, the change in such variable might be linked to fault 2. In summary, the fault isolation 
results suggested that the detected fault was probably a mixture of fault 2 and fault 4. 
From this example, it can be found that the multiple faults happening simultaneously cannot be 
directly diagnosed based on the classification results. Instead, such faults are identified as unknown 
faults by MDM. However, the fault isolation algorithm based on the missing variable analysis can 
indicate the most contributing variables and imply the types of the multiple faults, no matter these 
faults are known or unknown. 
 
5.6 Overall comparison based on all types of faults 
In this subsection, the overall comparison between MDM and FDA will be provided. Following the 
suggestion from an anonymous referee of this paper, these two methods were compared based on all 
types of TE faults. For each fault, MDM and FDA process models were built using both the normal 
operation data and the historical faulty data. Then, both models were applied to monitoring and 
diagnosing the test data. Each set of test data contains 50 normal data points and 500 faulty points. 
For comparison, three indices were utilized, including the false alarm rate, the fault detection rate, 
and the fault diagnosis rate. In MDM, only if the points are classified into the normal operation class 
and the corresponding values of the monitoring statistic are below the control limit of normal operation, 
these points are regarded as normal operation data. Otherwise, they are detected as faulty data. In 
addition, only if a detected faulty point is correctly classified, this point is diagnosed successfully. 
Based on such definitions, the false alarm rate is ratio between the number of the normal data points 
detected as a fault and the total number of the normal data points in the test data set. The fault detection 
rate is equal to the percentage of the faulty points that are detected, while the fault diagnosis rate is the 
percentage of the faulty points that are diagnosed correctly. In contrast, FDA conducts both fault 
detection and diagnosis using the information of classification. Therefore, its fault detection rate and 
fault diagnosis rate are the same. 
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All comparison results are listed in Table 1. In this table, the 20 types of faults are roughly divided 
into five groups. Faults 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 belong to the first group, which are caused by the significant 
step changes of some variables and are easy to detect. Both MDM and FDA models performed well in 
the detection and diagnosis of such faults. The second group consists of faults 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19 and 
20. In the monitoring and diagnosis of these faults, MDM outperformed FDA in both operation modes 
significantly. By investigating the detailed monitoring results that are not plotted here, it is found that 
large detection/diagnosis delay appeared in the FDA results, while MDM did not have such problem. 
This group of faults was mainly caused by slow drift or random variations in process characteristics, 
which were relatively insignificant in their starting periods. MDM showed its efficiency in detecting 
small changes. Faults 10, 11 and 14 form the third group. Again, the MDM model presented accurate 
detection and diagnosis results. However, FDA failed to differentiate the normal operation data and the 
faulty data, and provided high false alarm rate and low fault detection/diagnosis rate. In such cases, 
FDA could not find appropriate directions for classification, since the process data were non-Gaussian 
distributed. On the contrary, MDM was suited to handling such data distribution. The fourth group 
involves fault 5. Both MDM and FDA achieved good results in operation mode 3, but performed 
poorly in mode 1, where MDM showed high false alarm rate while FDA showed low fault 
detection/diagnosis rate. The analysis on the raw measurements indicated that the difference between 
the normal operation and the faulty operation was not obvious in mode 1. The last group includes faults 
3, 9, 15 and 16 that have been shown to be difficult to detect.
41
 At the first glance, it seems that FDA 
had higher detection/diagnosis rates than MDM. However, since FDA's false alarm rates were also 
much higher than those of MDM, it was difficult to tell which methods performed better in such cases. 
According to the above comparisons, it can be concluded that the overall performance of MDM 
was much better than that of FDA. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper proposed a fault detection, isolation and diagnosis method named mixture discriminant 
monitoring. As a hybrid method, MDM integrates supervised learning with the SPC charting technique 
and inherits the advantages of both techniques. It makes use of both normal and faulty data in process 
modeling. As a result, not only known types of faults but also new faults can be detected. For known 
types of faults, the diagnosis results are achieved automatically, while for unknown faults, the variables 
most responsible for the faults can be identified and can provide information to infer the root-causes. 
The effectiveness of the proposed method was verified using the benchmark Tennessee Eastman 
process. 
It may be necessary to point out that the phenomenon of fault propagation may be observed in 
industrial processes. When such a phenomenon occurs, the fault characteristics become time-varying,
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and the distribution of process data may change along the time direction and show non-Gaussian 
characteristics. For known faults, the proposed MDM method can model such faulty data with mixture 
of Gaussians. Then, the models can be utilized in process monitoring and fault diagnosis. If such faults 
are unknown and not modeled with the MDM model, they can still be detected in online monitoring. 
However, in fault isolation, MDM does not consider time-varying fault characteristics, but only makes 
use of the first several data points after detection. The question of how fault diagnosis can benefit from 
the fault propagation information will be answered in the future study. 
Future research should also focus on model updating. In industry, the amount of faulty data is 
usually much less than the amount of normal operation data. Therefore, it may be advantageous to first 
build an initial MDM model that contains only a small amount of faulty historical data. Then, when 
14 
 
more and more operation data are collected, the model should be updated recursively. This issue is out 
of the scope of this paper and will be studied in the future. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of normal and faulty process operating regions (the dashed curves represent the 
confidence bounds of known operating regions; the solid curves represent the classification boundaries). 
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Figure 2. Flowchart of (a) MDM-based process modeling and (b) process monitoring. 
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Figure 3. A brief flow diagram of the TE process. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of two process models: (a) FDA monitoring results of the training data, and (b) 
MDM monitoring results of the training data. 
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(b) 
Figure 5. Monitoring results of known faults in mode 1 based on (a) FDA, and (b) MDM. 
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(b) 
Figure 6. Monitoring results of known faults in mode 3 based on (a) FDA, and (b) MDM. 
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(b) 
Figure 7. Monitoring results of unknown fault 5 based on (a) FDA, and (b) MDM. 
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(b) 
Figure 8. Monitoring results of unknown fault 10 based on (a) FDA, and (b) MDM. 
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(b) 
Figure 9. Monitoring results of simultaneous faults based on (a) FDA, and (b) MDM. 
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Table 1. Overall comparison between MDM and FDA 
 
 
Fault ID 
MDM FDA 
Mode 1 Mode 3 Mode 1 Mode 3 
False 
alarm rate 
(%) 
Fault 
detection 
rate (%) 
Fault 
diagnosis 
rate (%) 
False 
alarm rate 
(%) 
Fault 
detection 
rate (%) 
Fault 
diagnosis 
rate (%) 
False 
alarm rate 
(%) 
Fault 
detection/ 
diagnosis 
rate (%) 
False 
alarm rate 
(%) 
Fault 
detection/ 
diagnosis 
rate (%) 
1 0 99.8 99.4 2 99.6 99.4 0 98.8 0 98 
2 0 99.4 98.8 2 97.8 97.8 0 96.8 0 96 
4 0 100 100 2 100 100 0 100 0 100 
6 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 0 100 
7 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 0 100 
8 0 95.4 95 0 96.4 96.2 0 63.4 0 85.6 
12 2 98.4 98.2 0 98.6 98 0 30 2 85.8 
13 0 96.6 96.2 0 95.8 94 0 77.8 0 65.6 
17 0 93.8 93.6 0 91.8 91.8 0 68 0 69 
18 0 87.2 85.6 2 94.4 94.2 0 55.4 0 87.2 
19 4 99 99 0 97 97 0 61.2 0 74.2 
20 4 95.6 95.2 0 94.4 94.4 0 90.6 0 71.8 
10 0 93.4 93 2 91.4 91 26 59.2 48 59.4 
11 0 99 99 0 99.2 99.2 82 59 82 66.4 
14 0 99.8 99.8 0 100 100 48 69.2 68 74 
5 30 51.8 51 2 100 100 0 0 0 100 
3 2 20.4 18.6 0 36.2 34.4 20 75.8 16 91.8 
27 
 
9 12 65.4 64.2 4 62.8 60.4 64 67.8 68 66.4 
15 2 8.2 7.6 2 22.8 21.8 44 77.2 56 75.8 
16 6 4.8 3.6 0 25.2 23.6 66 65.6 72 69.8 
 
 
